Aldo Rossi

The Architecture of the City


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1a Horizontal section of the Mausoleum of Hadrian, built 135-139 A.D., later transformed into the Castel Sant'Angelo.

1b Drawing of a labyrinth by Dom Nicolas de Rély, 1611, based on the paving pattern on the floor of Amiens Cathedral. This design, executed in 1288, was known as the “Maison Dédalus” or House of Daedalus.
... the relief and design of structures appears more clearly when content, which is the living energy of meaning, is neutralized, somewhat like the architecture of an uninhabited or deserted city, reduced to its skeleton by some catastrophe of nature or art. A city no longer inhabited, not simply left behind, but haunted by meaning and culture, this state of being haunted, which keeps the city from returning to nature...

Jacques Derrida

Writing and Difference

The image on the cover of the fourth Italian edition of Aldo Rossi's L'Architettura della città summarizes in condensed form not only the ambivalent nature of Rossi's architectural work, but also the intrinsic problem of its relationship to the idea of city which is proposed by this book. This image, a horizontal section of the Mausoleum of Hadrian in the Castel Sant'Angelo in Rome, reads as a spiral. The spiral is associated with the form of the labyrinth, a construction which, according to classical myth, was the invention of Daedalus. Daedalus, as the only architect of mythology and the supposed inventor of many "wondrous" works of architecture, has become the city the symbol par excellence of the humanist architect. As such, the labyrinth, Daedalus's creation, can be considered emblematic of a humanist condition of architecture. But this is not the spiral's only meaning: as an unfolding path or route, the spiral has also been interpreted as a psychological figure, the symbol of a process of transformation. Thus, we are obliged to interpret Rossi's use of the image on the cover of his book in two ways: first, in terms of the spiral as a mausoleum, as representing a symbolic place of death, in this case—even if unconsciously on his part—that of humanism; and at the same time, in terms of the spiral as labyrinth, as representing a place of transformation.

The spiral has a further, more personal meaning for Rossi. It symbolizes his own rite of passage, his role as part of a generation progressively more distanced from the positivism of modern architecture by the collapse of historical time and left drifting into an uncertain present. While this book in many ways is a critique of the Modern Movement, it nevertheless reflects an ambivalence with respect to modernism. It suggests Rossi's own uncertainty as much with the general ideology of modernism as with the failure of the specific aspirations of modern architecture. Rossi's anxiety with respect to modernism is thus refracted through his sympathy with its very concerns. It was, after all, modernism which focused on the city as one of architecture's central problems. Prior to modernism, cities were thought to have evolved over time through a process which was an imitation of natural law. But in the view of the polemicists of the Modern Movement, this natural time had run out, and in its place succeeded the time of historicism.

For the architects of the early twentieth century, the appropriateness of the act of intervening clinically in the city's historical and natural evolution was beyond question. Supported by the enormous moral impetus of social and technological necessity (which had replaced the model of natural evolution), they attempted from the stronghold of their "castle of purity" to storm the bastion of evils identified with the nineteenth-century city. To them the stakes appeared higher than they had ever been. In this heroic climate of modernism the city of modern architecture, supposedly born out of a rupture of history, was progressively propelled by that very history toward the vision of a sanitized utopia.

The perceived failure of modern architecture to realize this utopia—either to supersede the nineteenth-century city or to mitigate its destruction after the
The Texts of Analogue

Now let us . . . suppose that Rome is not a human habitation but a psychological entity with a similarly long and copious past—an entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest one. . . . If we want to represent historical sequence in spatial terms we can only do it by juxtaposition in space: the same space cannot have two different contents. . . . It shows us how far we are from mastering the characteristics of mental life by representing them in pictorial terms.

Sigmund Freud

Civilization and Its Discontents

The Architecture of the City along with all of Rossi's production is an attempt to build a different kind of castle from that of the moderns. It is an elaborate scaffolding erected for and by someone who can no longer climb its steps to die a hero's death. Proposing an *other* architecture, an *other* architect, and most importantly, an *other* process for their understanding, it can be seen as an attempt to break not only from the traditional humanist definition of the relationship of object and subject, but also from the more recent modernist one. Modernism proposed a new interpretation of the subject which was never fulfilled by modern architecture; in this respect modern architecture can be seen as simply an extension of nineteenth-century functionalism. Rossi's new construct begins as a critique of the city of modern architecture and from this goes on to propose an *other* object.

The *other* object, the architecture of the book's title, is now defined in two ways: as the ultimate and verifiable data within the real city, and as an autonomous structure. But this data is not gathered and applied with the reductive scientism used by the proponents of the Modern Movement city, but rather through a more complex rationalism provided by urban geography, economics, and above all history. Nor is its autonomy entirely that of modernism, of the discipline of architecture in itself. Rather, it resides in architecture’s specific processes and its built reality.

This twofold idea of the city as ultimate data—an archaeological artifact—and of the city as autonomous structure not only characterizes the new city as an object, but more importantly, and perhaps inadvertently, redefines its *subject*—the architect himself. As opposed to the humanist architect of the sixteenth century, and the functionalist architect of the twentieth century, Rossi's architect would seem to be an unheroic, autonomous researcher—much like his psychoanalyst counterpart who is similarly distanced from the object of his analysis and who no
longer believes in science or progress. However, not surprisingly, this redefinition of the architect as a neutral subject is problematic.

Whereas the humanist conception attempted an integration of subject and object, the modernist conception polemically attempted their separation. The problematic nature of the practice of modern architecture with respect to the theory of modernism has to do precisely with its inability to effect this separation and thus its contamination with imperatives from the humanist conception. Rossi intuitively understands this problem; but he cannot face the consequences of taking on the unrealized program of modernism. Therefore, his new formulation focuses on a mediating element: the process of the work. If the subject and the object are to be independent, it is now the process, previously considered neutral, which must assume the forces which formerly were contained in the subject and the object. Into this new idea of process Rossi reintroduces the elements of history and typology, but not as a nostalgia for narrative or a reductive scientism. Rather, history becomes analogous to a “skeleton” whose condition serves as a measure of time and, in turn, is measured by time. It is this skeleton which bears the imprint of the actions that have taken place and will take place in the city. For Rossi, architecture’s history lies in its material; and it is this material which becomes the object of analysis—the city. Typology, on the other hand, becomes the instrument, the “apparatus”—to borrow a term which Rossi will later use in his Scientific Autobiography—of time’s measurement; it attempts to be both logical and scientific. The skeleton and its measuring apparatus become the process and ultimately the object of the autonomous researcher. History and type, as components parts of research, allow for transformations of themselves which are “prearranged but still unforeseeable.”

The skeleton, an image which also appears in Rossi’s Scientific Autobiography, is a particularly useful analogue for this idea of city. For the skeleton links the city to history. It is a history which is limited to the historiographical act—to a pure knowledge of the past, without the historicizing imperative to determine the future. For Rossi, historicism, the modernist critique of history, is an impediment to invention. Historicism deals in causes or imperatives while history focuses on effects or facts. The skeleton thus provides an analogue for Rossi’s understanding of history, for it is at once a structure and a ruin, a record of events and a record of time, and in this sense a statement of facts and not causes. But these are not its only attributes. For it is also an object that can be used to study its own structure. This structure has two aspects: one is its own abstract significance; the other is the precise nature of its individual parts. The latter is of particular importance because the mere study of structure—of the vertebrae of the skeleton—is far too general for Rossi. Any generalized framework acts as a mesh which always allows the most important parts to pass through—in this case, the city’s most singular elements and those which give it its specificity.

Thus, the skeleton, which may on one level be compared to the urban plan, while a general structure of parts, is also a material artifact in itself: a collective artifact. The skeleton’s nature as a collective artifact allows us to understand Rossi’s metaphor of the city as a giant man-made house, a macrocosm of the individual house of man. Here the dissolution of scale becomes central to the argument, as will be seen. This giant house comes into being through a double process. One process is that of production, in the sense of the city as a work of manufatto (manufacture), an object literally made by the hands of men; the second process is that of time, which ultimately produces an autonomous artifact. The first process assumes a time which is only that of manufacture—a time with no
before or after; it relates the object of manufacture, which has no extensive or indeterminate history, to man. The second process is not only singular as opposed to collective, but it supersedes man in that it has its own reason and motivation and thus its own autonomous form, which, by virtue of its not being determined by the subject man, is independent of its use.

This latter process, that of time, can be seen in Rossi’s concept of permanence, which affects collective and individual artifacts in the city in different ways. The two main permanences in the city are housing and monuments. With respect to the first, Rossi distinguishes between housing and individual houses. Housing is a permanence in the city while individual houses are not; thus, a residential district in the city may persist as such over many centuries, while individual houses within a district will tend to change. With respect to monuments, the relationship is the opposite, for here it is the individual artifact that persists in the city. Monuments are defined by Rossi as primary elements in the city which are persistent and characteristic urban artifacts. They are distinguished from housing, the other primary element in the city, by their nature as a place of symbolic function, and thus a function related to time, as opposed to a place of conventional function, which is only related to use.

As a permanence and a primary element in the city, a monument is dialectically related to the city’s growth, and this dialectic of permanence and growth is characteristic of time in Rossi’s skeleton-city. It implies a city which not only possesses a before and an after, but which is defined by their interrelationship. Rossi defines primary elements as “those elements which can both retard and accelerate the process of urbanization in a city.” Thus they are catalytic. When a monument retards the process of urbanization, it is considered by Rossi to be “pathological.” The Alhambra in Granada is an example of one such part of a city functioning as a museum piece. In the city whose analogue is the skeleton, such a museum piece is like an embalmed body: it gives only the appearance of being alive.

These preserved or pathological permanences, mummified presences in the city, often tend to owe their permanent character to their location within a specific context. In this sense, the quasi-naturalistic urbanism of the contemporary “contextualists” is dialectically opposed, in Rossi’s view, to the concept of evolutionary time. For Rossi real time tends to erode and supersede the neatly circumscribed and meticulously observed imagery of a specific urban context. In light of the recent development of a so-called contextual urbanism which has come to dominate urban thought some fifteen years after the original publication of this book, Rossi’s text can be seen as an anticipatory argument against the “empty formalism” of context reductively seen as a plan relationship of figure and ground.

However, permanences in the city are not only “pathological.” At times they may be “propelling.” They serve to bring the past into the present, providing a past that can still be experienced. Artifacts like the Theater at Arles or the Palazzo della Ragione in Padua tend to synchronize with the process of urbanization because they are not defined only by an original or previous function, nor by their context, but have survived precisely because of their form—one which is able to accommodate different functions over time. Here again, the analogue of the skeleton can be seen to be quite precise. Like the skeleton which is not living and has lost its original function, only its form remaining intact, the propelling permanence continues to function as a record of time. This argument, which in it-
self is a critique of “naive functionalism,” contains within it Rossi’s concept of specific place or locus.

The locus is a component of an individual artifact which, like permanence, is determined not just by space but also by time, by topography and form, and, most importantly, by its having been the site of a succession of both ancient and more recent events. For Rossi, the city is a theater of human events. This theater is no longer just a representation; it is a reality. It absorbs events and feelings, and every new event contains within it a memory of the past and a potential memory of the future. Thus, while the locus is a site which can accommodate a series of events, it also in itself constitutes an event. In this sense, it is a unique or characteristic place, a “locus solus.” Its singularity is recognizable in signs that come to mark the occurrence of these events. Included in this idea of the locus solus, then, is the specific but also universal relationship between a certain site and the buildings that are on it. Buildings may be sites of events that have occurred on a specific site; and this threefold relationship of site, event, and sign becomes a characteristic of urban artifacts. Hence, the locus may be said to be the place on which architecture or form can be imprinted. Architecture gives form to the singularity of place, and it is in this specific form that the locus persists through many changes, particularly transformations of function. Rossi uses the example of the city of Split in Yugoslavia. He says:

The city of Split which grew up within the walls of Diocletian’s palace gave new uses and new meanings to unchangeable forms. This is symbolic of the meaning of the architecture of the city, where the broadest adaptability to multiple functions corresponds to an extreme precision of form.

This relationship suggests a different limit to history. History exists so long as an object is in use; that is, so long as a form relates to its original function. However, when form and function are severed, and only form remains vital, history shifts into the realm of memory. When history ends, memory begins. The singular form of Split now not only signifies its own individuality, but at the same time, it is also a sign, a record of events that are part of a collective—that is, urban—memory. History comes to be known through the relationship between a collective memory of events, the singularity of place (locus solus), and the sign of the place as expressed in form.

Thus is can be said that the process by which the city is imprinted with form is urban history, but the succession of events constitutes its memory. The “soul of the city,” an idea derived by Rossi from the French urban geographers, resides in its history; once this soul is given form, it becomes the sign of a place. Memory becomes the guide to its structure. If time in the chronological sense belonged to a classical context, and in the historicist sense to a modernist context, then once associated with memory rather than history, it moves into a psychological context.

The new time of architecture is thus that of memory, which replaces history. The individual artifact for the first time is understood within the psychological construct of collective memory. Time as collective memory leads Rossi to his particular transformation of the idea of type. With the introduction of memory into the object, the object comes to embody both an idea of itself and a memory of a former self. Type is no longer a neutral structure found in history but rather an analytical and experimental structure which now can be used to operate on the skeleton of history; it becomes an apparatus, an instrument for analysis and measure. As has been said, this apparatus, while purportedly scientific and logi-
cal, is not reductive, but allows urban elements to be perceived as having a meaning that is always original and authentic and, although typologically predetermined, often unforeseen. Its logic, then, exists prior to a form, but also comes to constitute the form in a new way.

Thus it can be said that the apparatus used to measure the object implies and also is implied in the object itself. This returns us to the analogue of the skeleton, which was seen to be at once instrument and object. With this recognition appears a new object-apparatus, an object—as opposed to a subject—that for the first time analyses and also invents. This is the other process mediating between architect and architecture. In the past, innovations in architecture did not generally occur through the object; typology was never seen as having the potential to be the animating force of a design process. Rossi, however, discovers in typology the possibility of invention precisely because type is now both process and object. As a process, it contains a synthetic character which is in itself a manifestation of form. Moreover, while the alteration of certain typological elements over time is a stimulus to invention, it is also the effect of memory on type which allows for the new process of design. Memory fuses with history to give type-form a significance beyond that of an original function. Thus, typology, which previously consisted only of the classification of the known, now can serve as a catalyst for invention. It becomes the essence of design for the autonomous researcher.

Both the idea of the end of history, when a form no longer embodies its original function, and the passing of type from the realm of history into that of memory lead Rossi to his internalized, analogous design process. Analogy is Rossi’s most important apparatus. It is equally useful to him in writing and in drawing. It is in this context that this book can be seen as an analogous artifact itself—a written analogue to built and drawn artifacts. The written analogue, like the drawn one, is bound up with both place and memory. Yet unlike the city, the urban skeleton, the analogue is detached from specific place and specific time, and becomes instead an abstract locus existing in what is a purely typological or architectural time-place. In this way, by displacing type from history to make a connection between place and memory, Rossi attempts through the erasure of history and transcendence of real places to reconcile the contradictions of modernist utopia—literally “no place”—and humanist reality—built “some place.”

The time of analogy, a bifocal lens of history and memory, takes in and collapses chronological time—the time of events—and atmospheric time—the time of place: place and event, locus solus plus time-place. The place of analogy is thereby abstracted from the real city. Linking type-forms and specific places, it dispossesses, reassociates, and thus transforms real places and real times. It is no place, but a no place that is different from that of modernist utopia precisely because it is rooted in both history and memory. This suppression of the precise boundaries of time and place within the analogue produces the same kind of dialectic that exists in memory between remembering and forgetting.

Here the analogous city can be seen to subvert the real city. Where the skeleton was seen as the form and measure of specific times and places in the city, the analogous design process displaces the specifics of time and place in the city for another reality, a psychological one based on memory. While the skeleton, as a physical and analytical object embedded in a humanist and modernist context, represents verifiable data, archaeological artifact, memory and analogy bring the process of architecture into the realm of the psychological, transforming
both subject and object. The analogous process, when applied to the actual geography of the city, therefore acts as a corrosive agent.

The subversive analogues proposed in Rossi's work involve two kinds of transformation. One is the dislocation of place, the other the dissolution of scale. In the former, the logical geography of the skeleton is displaced through typological invention. Rossi uses the example of Cannaletto's painting of three Palladian projects; here, the different places of the projects are collapsed into one place. In the latter kind of transformation, the dissolution of scale allows the individual building to refer analogically to the city as a whole. This is illustrated in Rossi's example of Diocletian's Palace at Split: "Split discovers in its typological form an entire city. From here it follows that the single building can be designed by analogy with the city." Even more importantly, this implies, the design of cities lies latent in the idea of the individual building. In Rossi's view, the city's dimensions are unimportant because its meaning and quality reside not in its different scales, but in its actual constructions and individual artifacts. Once again, it is time which connects things which belong to different scales and heterogeneous contexts. This time-place continuity opposes the discontinuity between the industrial—modernist—city and the historical—humanist—city which was proclaimed by the Modern Movement.

Rossi's denial of the importance of scale in the context of the city is thereby a direct assault on most twentieth-century urbanism. Yet precisely within this context it becomes problematic. For with the dissolution of scale in the analogous process there is a seeming return to the very same humanist position first proposed in Alberti's reciprocal metaphor of the house and the city: "the city is like a large house, and the house in turn is like a small city." Rossi's attempt to propose an other urban model through analogy becomes conflated with this specifically fifteenth-century model of the city as the microcosm of a harmonic and macrocosmic universe. For Rossi, the object represents a dialectic between the giant collective house of the city and its individual, specific houses, the city's artifacts. So long as this dialectic remains internal to architecture and thereby autonomous, the city as object is separate from man. Like a truly modernist object, it grows upon itself and refers to itself, acquiring its own consciousness and memory. However, once it is seen to be based on a metaphorical conception of the house of individual man, it returns again to the Albertian humanist relationship and a fifteenth-century conception of the object. Rossi never resolves this ambivalence in his work. For despite the latent humanism, there is always an overriding pessimism which undercut this potential neo-Enlightenment position. In Rossi's own pronouncement, "the time of each man is limited; the future, therefore, must be the present."

Analogy, as has been said, allows for both memory and history. It mixes "autobiography and civic history," individual and collective. In Rossi's formulation, all great manifestations of social life and all great works of art are born in unconscious life. This leads him directly, if unwittingly, into a second contradiction. The city, a social entity, is in psychological terms a product of a collective unconscious. At the same time, as an amalgam of formal artifacts, it is a product of many individuals. That is, it is both a product of the collective and a design for the collective. In both cases the collective subject is the central concept. This returns us to Rossi's idea of the locus. Whereas the locus solus defines the nature of the object, homo civis now defines the nature of the subject. The contradiction of the singular object and the collective subject further betrays Rossi's neohumanism, for despite his pessimism about the power of the individual to domi-
nate history, still he sees the city ultimately as “the human achievement par excellence.”

In the end, there is no model for a twentieth-century city in Rossi’s work, no city-object which corresponds to the collective psychological subject. Rossi finally obscures the presence of a psychological context and underlines the necessity for a psychological model. To propose that the same relationship between individual subject (man) and individual object (house) which existed in the Renaissance now obtains between the collective psychological subject (the population of the modern city) and its singular object (the city, but seen as a house at a different scale) is to imply that nothing has changed, that the city of humanist man is the same place as the city of psychological man. Rossi’s psychological subject—the autonomous researcher—still continues to seek his own home in the collective house of the city.

Cities are in reality great camps of the living and the dead where many elements remain like signals, symbols, cautions. When the holiday is over, what remains of the architecture is scarred, and the sand consumes the street again. There is nothing left, but to resume with a certain obstinacy the reconstruction of elements and instruments in expectation of another holiday.
Aldo Rossi
A Scientific Autobiography

For Aldo Rossi the European city has become the house of the dead. Its history, its function, has ended; it has erased the specific memories of the houses of individual childhood to become a locus of collective memory. As a giant or collective house of memory, it has a psychological reality which arises from its being a place of fantasy and illusion, an analogue of both life and death as transitional states. For Rossi, writings and drawings are an attempt to explore this giant house of memory and all those specific places of habitation encountered between the childhood house of fantasy and hope and the house of illusion and death.

The bourgeois house of Rossi’s childhood permitted fantasy, but denied the ordering of type. The Architecture of the City attempts, through the apparatus of type, to place the city before us in such a way that, in spite of history, memory can imagine and reconstruct a future time of fantasy. This memory is set into motion through the inventive potential of the typological apparatus, the analogous design process. Rossi’s drawings of the “analogous city” can be seen to evolve directly from his writing of The Architecture of the City. The analogous drawing embodies a changed condition of representation; it exists as the record of its own history. Thus, Rossi’s drawings of the city, giving form to their own history, become part of the city, not just a representation of it. They have an authenticity, a reality which is, precisely, that of illusion. This reality may then, in turn, be represented in actual buildings.

The architectural drawing, formerly thought of exclusively as a form of representation, now becomes the locus of another reality. It is not only the site of illusion, as it has been traditionally, but also a real place of the suspended time of both life and death. Its reality is neither forward time—progress—nor past time—nostalgia, for by being an autonomous object it eludes both the progressive and regressive forces of historicism. In this way, it, and not its built representation, becomes architecture: the locus of a collective idea of death and,
through its autonomous invention, of a new metaphysic of life in which death is no longer a finality but only a transitional state. The analogous drawing thereby approximates this changed condition of subject—man—relative to his object—city.

Rossi's analogous drawings, like his analogous writings, deal primarily with time. Unlike the analogous writings, however, the drawings represent the suspension of two times: the one processual—where the drawn object is something moving toward but not yet arrived at its built representation; and the other atmospheric—where drawn shadows indicate the stopping of the clock, are a frozen and constant reminder of this new equation of life and death. No longer in the analogous drawing is time represented by a precisely measured aspect of light, the length of a shadow, or the aging of a thing. Rather, time is expressed as an infinite past which takes things back to the timelessness of childhood, of illusions, of fragments of possessions and autobiographical images of the author's own alienated childhood—of which history's narrative can no longer give an effective account. Yet for Rossi, this personal aspect of architecture is unsentimentalized. In his personal vision of time, the same dialectic applies as in the city: history provides the material for biography but memory provides the material for autobiography; as in the city, memory begins when history ends. It encompasses both future time and past time: a project that has to be done and one that is already completed. The images of ruin activate this unconscious memory, linking the discarded and the fragmentary with new beginnings. Here again, the apparently coherent orderliness of logic is biographical, but fragments are autobiographical. Abandonment and death—the attributes of the skeleton—are through this dialectic now seen as parts of a process of transformation; death is a new beginning associated with some unknown hope.

Ultimately, The Architecture of the City, notwithstanding its attempt to place itself within a certain tradition of "scientific" writing about the city, is a very private and personal text. It is the written analogue of yet another analogous process: the unconscious revelation of a potential new relationship of man to object. It anticipates the psychological subject—homo civilis—of the collective unconscious; but at the same time, it also nostalgically evokes the individual subject, the mythic hero-architect of humanism, the inventor of the house. The shadow of the humanist poet hovers continuously behind the figure of the autonomous researcher. The potential transformation of the individual into the collective subject is left in suspension. Ambiguously, the object of the analogous city begins to define the subject once again, not so much as a humanist-hero, nor as the psychological collective, but as a complex, divided, and shattered solitary survivor, appearing before, but not withstanding, the collective will of history.

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