The Death of the Author

In his story *Sarrasine* Balzac, describing a castrato disguised as a woman, writes the following sentence: 'This was woman herself, with her sudden fears, her irrational whims, her instinctive worries, her impetuous boldness, her fussings, and her delicious sensibility.' Who is speaking thus? Is it the hero of the story bent on remaining ignorant of the castrato hidden beneath the woman? Is it Balzac the individual, furnished by his personal experience with a philosophy of Woman? Is it Balzac the author professing 'literary' ideas on femininity? Is it universal wisdom? Romantic psychology? We shall never know, for the good reason that writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing.

No doubt it has always been that way. As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to acting directly on reality but intrinsively, that is to say, finally outside of any function other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself, this disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death, writing begins. The sense of this phenomenon, however, has varied; in ethnographic societies the responsibility for a narrative is never assumed by a person but by a mediator, shaman or relator whose 'performance'—the mastery of the narrative code—may possibly be admired but never his 'genius'. The author is a modern figure, a product of our society insofar as, emerging from the Middle Ages with English empiricism,

French rationalism and the personal faith of the Reforma-
tion, it discovered the prestige of the individual, of, as it is
more nobly put, the 'human person'. It is thus logical that
in literature it should be this positivism, the epitome and
culmination of capitalist ideology, which has attached
the greatest importance to the 'person' of the author. The
author still reigns in histories of literature, biographies of
writers, interviews, magazines, as in the very consciousness
of men of letters anxious to unite their person and their
work through diaries and memoirs. The image of literature
to be found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centred on
the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions, while
criticism still consists for the most part in saying that
Baudelaire's work is the failure of Baudelaire the man,
Van Gogh's his madness, Tchaikovsky's his vice. The
explanation of a work is always sought in the man or woman
who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through the
more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of
a single person, the author 'confiding' in us.

Though the sway of the Author remains powerful (the
new criticism has often done no more than consolidate it),
it goes without saying that certain writers have long since
attempted to loosen it. In France, Mallarmé was doubtless
the first to see and to foresee in its full extent the necessity
to substitute language itself for the person who until then
had been supposed to be its owner. For him, for us too, it
is language which speaks, not the author; to write is, through
a prerequisite impersonality (not at all to be confused with
the castrating objectivity of the realist novelist), to reach
that point where only language acts, 'performs', and not
'me'. Mallarmé's entire poetics consists in suppressing
the author in the interests of writing (which is, as will be seen,
to restore the place of the reader). Valéry, encumbered by a
psychology of the Ego, considerably diluted Mallarmé's
theory but, his taste for classicism leading him to turn to the lessons of rhetoric, he never stopped calling into question and deriding the Author; he stressed the linguistic and, as it were, 'hazardous' nature of his activity, and throughout his prose works he militated in favour of the essentially verbal condition of literature, in the face of which all recourse to the writer's interiority seemed to him pure superstition. Proust himself, despite the apparently psychological character of what are called his analyses, was visibly concerned with the task of inextricably blurring, by an extreme sublimation, the relation between the writer and his characters; by making of the narrator not he who has seen and felt nor even he who is writing, but he who is going to write (the young man in the novel – but, in fact, how old is he and who is he? – wants to write but cannot; the novel ends when writing at last becomes possible), Proust gave modern writing its epic. By a radical reversal, instead of putting his life into his novel, as is so often maintained, he made of his very life a work for which his own book was the model; so that it is clear to us that Charlus does not imitate Montesquiou but that Montesquiou – in his anecdotal, historical reality – is no more than a secondary fragment, derived from Charlus. Lastly, to go no further than this prehistory of modernity, Surrealism, though unable to accord language a supreme place (language being system and the aim of the movement being, romantically, a direct subversion of codes – itself moreover illusory: a code cannot be destroyed, only 'played off'), contributed to the desacralization of the image of the Author by ceaselessly recommending the abrupt disappointment of expectations of meaning (the famous surrealist 'jolt'), by entrusting the hand with the task of writing as quickly as possible what the head itself is unaware of (automatic writing), by accepting the principle and the experience of several people writing together. Leaving aside literature itself (such distinctions really becoming invalid), linguistics has recently provided the destruction of the Author with a valuable analytical tool by showing that the whole of the enunciation is an empty process, functioning perfectly without there being any need for it to be filled with the person of the interlocutors. Linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, just as I is nothing other than the instance saying: I: language knows a 'subject', not a 'person', and this subject, empty outside of the very enunciation which defines it, suffices to make language 'hold together', suffices, that is to say, to exhaust it.

The removal of the Author (one could talk here with Brecht of a veritable 'distancing', the Author diminishing like a figurine at the far end of the literary stage) is not merely an historical fact or an act of writing; it utterly transforms the modern text (or – which is the same thing – the text is henceforth made and read in such a way that at all its levels the author is absent). The temporality is different. The Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as the past of his own book: book and author stand automatically on a single line divided into a before and an after. The Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to say that he exists before it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of antecedence to his work as a father to his child. In complete contrast, the modern scriptor is born simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject with the book as predicate; there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is eternally written here and now. The fact is (or, it follows) that writing can no longer designate an operation of recording, notation, representation, 'depiction' (as the Classics would say); rather, it designates exactly what linguists, referring to Oxford philosophy, call a performative, a rare verbal form (exclusively given in the first person and in the present tense) in which the enuncia-
tion has no other content (contains no other proposition) than the act by which it is uttered – something like the *I declare* of kings or the *I sing* of very ancient poets. Having buried the Author, the modern scriptor can thus no longer believe, as according to the pathetic view of his predecessors, that this hand is too slow for his thought or passion and that consequently, making a law of necessity, he must emphasize this delay and indefinitely ‘polish’ his form. For him, on the contrary, the hand, cut off from any voice, borne by a pure gesture of inscription (and not of expression), traces a field without origin – or which, at least, has no other origin than language itself, language which ceaselessly calls into question all origins.

We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture. Similar to Bouvard and Pécuchet, those eternal copyists, at once sublime and comic and whose profound ridiculousness indicates precisely the truth of writing, the writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. His only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any one of them. Did he wish to *express himself*, he ought at least to know that the inner ‘thing’ he thinks to ‘translate’ is itself only a ready-formed dictionary, its words only explainable through other words, and so on indefinitely; something experienced in exemplary fashion by the young Thomas de Quincey, he who was so good at Greek that in order to translate absolutely modern ideas and images into that dead language, he had, so Baudelaire tells us (in *Paradis Artificiels*), ‘created for himself an unfailing dictionary, vastly more extensive and complex than those resulting from the ordinary patience of purely literary themes’.

Succeeding the Author, the scriptor no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather this immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt: life never does more than imitate the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of signs, an imitation that is lost, infinitely deferred.

Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing. Such a conception suits criticism very well, the latter then allotting itself the important task of discovering the Author (or its hypostases: society, history, psyche, liberty) beneath the work: when the Author has been found, the text is ‘explained’ – victory to the critic. Hence there is no surprise in the fact that, historically, the reign of the Author has also been that of the Critic, nor again in the fact that criticism (be it new) is today undermined along with the Author. In the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be *disentangled*, nothing *deciphered*; the structure can be followed, ‘run’ (like the thread of a stock- ing) at every point and at every level, but there is nothing beneath: the space of writing is to be ranged over, not pierced; writing ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systematic exemption of meaning. In precisely this way literature (it would be better from now on to say *writing*), by refusing to assign a ‘secret’, an ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases – reason, science, law.

Let us come back to the Balzac sentence. No one, no ‘person’, says it: its source, its voice, is not the true place of the writing, which is reading. Another – very precise –
example will help to make this clear: recent research
(J.-P. Vernant) has demonstrated the constitutively ambi-
guous nature of Greek tragedy, its texts being woven from
words with double meanings that each character under-
stands unilaterally (this perpetual misunderstanding is
exactly the 'tragic'); there is, however, someone who
understands each word in its duplicity and who, in addition,
hears the very deafness of the characters speaking in front
of him – this someone being precisely the reader (or here,
the listener). Thus is revealed the total existence of writing:
a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many
cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue,
parody, contestation, but there is one place where this
multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, not,
as was hitherto said, the author. The reader is the space
on which all the quotations that make up a writing are
inscribed without any of them being lost; a text's unity lies
not in its origin but in its destination. Yet this destination
cannot any longer be personal: the reader is without history,
biography, psychology; he is simply that someone who
holds together in a single field all the traces by which the
written text is constituted. Which is why it is derisory to
condemn the new writing in the name of a humanism
hypocritically turned champion of the reader's rights.
Classic criticism has never paid any attention to the reader;
for it, the writer is the only person in literature. We are
now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer by the
arrogant antiphralstical recriminations of good society in
favour of the very thing it sets aside, ignores, smothers, or
destroy; we know that to give writing its future, it is
necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader
must be at the cost of the death of the Author.

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1. [Cf. Jean-Pierre Vernant (with Pierre Vidal-Naquet), *Mythe et

Musica Practica

There are two musics (at least so I have always thought):
the music one listens to, the music one plays. These two
musics are two totally different arts, each with its own history,
its own sociology, its own aesthetics, its own erotic; the
same composer can be minor if you listen to him, tre-
mendous if you play him (even badly) – such is Schumann.
The music one plays comes from an activity that is very
little auditory, being above all manual (and thus in a way
much more sensual). It is the music which you or I can play,
alone or among friends, with no other audience than its
participants (that is, with all risk of theatre, all temptation
of hysteria removed); a muscular music in which the part
taken by the sense of hearing is one only of ratification,
as though the body were hearing – and not 'the soul';
a music which is not played 'by heart': seated at the key-
board or the music stand, the body controls, conducts,
co-ordinates, having itself to transcription what it reads,
making sound and meaning, the body as inscriber and not
just transmitter, simple receiver. This music has disappeared;
initially the province of the idle (aristocratic) class, it
lapsed into an insipid social rite with the coming of the
democracy of the bourgeoisie (the piano, the young lady,
the drawing room, the nocturne) and then faded out al-
together (who plays the piano today?). To find practical
music in the West, one has now to look to another public,
another repertoire, another instrument (the young gener-
ation, vocal music, the guitar). Concurrently, passive, recep-
tive music, sound music, is become the music (that of concert,
festival, record, radio): playing has ceased to exist; musical